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No. 6225 ~~.,================================== 
In 
. The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
WHITNEY PARRY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
J. H. CROSBY, as .Justice of 
the Peace of Kanab Precinct, 
.Kane County, State of Utah, 
~GEORGE A.- SWAPP, as 
Sheriff of Kane \.._County, 
State of Utah, and DAVID 
L. PUGH, as County Attor-
ney of Kane County, State of . 
.. Utah, 
Defendants and Respondent;~. · 
:·Appeal From the Sixth Judicial District Court, 
Kane County, Utah. 
Honorable Henry D. Hayes, Judge. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
... JOSEPH CHEZ, Attorney General, 
: .. DAVID L. PUGH, County Attorney, Kane County, 
S. D. HUFFAKER, Assi~tant Attorney General, 
, Attornev~ for Defendant~ 
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In 
The Supreme {gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
WHITNEY PARRY 
' Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
J. H. CROSBY, as Justice of 
the Peace of Kanab Precinct, 
Kane County, State of Utah, 
GEORGE A. SWAPP, as 
.Sheriff of Kane County, 
State of Utah, and DAVID 
L. PUGH, as County Attor-
ney of Kane County, State of 
Utah, 
Defendants and Respondent3. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
By these proceedings, appellant seeks to re-
strain three public officials of Kane County from 
enforcing our laws relating to slot machines. The 
controversy grew out of the following facts: 
The Sheriff of 1Kane County, Utah, seized four 
slot machines at what is. known as the Parry Lodge 
in the town of Kanab. He took possession of the 
macbtines and delivered them to the respondent, 
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Ju::;.tice of the .feace. 'l'he Justice issued a citation 
order, which was s.erved upon the appellant, direct-
ing 'him to appear at a certain time and p1ace and 
show cause why the machines should not be de-
stroyed. Before the tirne set for hearing: the cita-
tion order, appellant appeared at the District Court 
of _i_{ane ·County and secured a temporary restrain-
ing order, which was. ::;erved upon the respondents, 
directing them to appear at a time fixed to show 
cause why the temporary order should not be made 
permanent. A hearing wlas had in the District 
Court, a~d after the matter had been submitted, the 
District Judge refused to make the restraining 
order permanent, and this appeal is takP.n to I·e-
verse the District CourL 
In his complaint for a re::;training order, appel-
lant alleges that the respondents as public offieials, 
without due process, or any process whatsoever, 
took from his possession four deviees, containing 
more than $600. In its findings, the District Court 
found that these four devices were slot machines, 
one being a five cent machine, one a ten cent 
machine, one a twenty-five cent machine and one 
a fifty cent machine. (Ah. 12). 
Before taking possession of tlw~e machines. 
the Sheriff signed an affidavit before the Justice 
of the Peace to the effect that, "he has reason to 
believe and does believe that the said \Yhitney 
Parry, has in his place of business, certain ~SlOt 
1nachines, which are being operated contra.ry to 
law." The Justice of the Peace thereupon issued 
what is described as a writ of attachment, whereby 
he commanded the Sheriff or Constable to attach, 
save and keep any and all slot machines which m~y 
be found at appellan:1Ps place oi business. The 
evidence is not clear as to whether or not the affi-
davit above mentioned, or the writ of attachment 
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3 
were served upon the appellant, but for the reasons 
as hereinafter stated, we feel that it is immaterial 
whether or not these instruments were served on 
appellant or even executed or filed. 
On Page 7 of appellant's brief he states his 
contention in the following words : 
"\Vas the proceeding in the Justice's 
Court sufficient to give that court juris-
diction to seize or to order destruction of 
the sO-Called slot machines and the for-
feiture of the money contained in them to 
Kane County1'' 
He claims that the proceeding'S prelinrinary to 
the taking of said machines were in personam and 
not in rem. 
It is true that the affidavit and writ of attach-
ment above mentioned were entitled, "The State of 
Utah, Plaintiff v. Whitney Parry, Defendant.'' 
Appellant contends that it should have been en-
titled, ''State of Utah, Plaintiff, v. Four Slot 
Machines, Defendant." It will be noted also that 
the writ of :attachment did not direct the arrest of 
Whitney Parry, but ordered the Sh rriff to attach 
the slot machines. (Ab. 11). Aft~·r taking th~ 
machines, the Sheriff made his return E;tating in 
effect that he had taken the four slot 1nachines., and 
was holding them to be disposed of by order of the 
C'll~rt. (Ab. 12). The citation issued by the Justice, 
and served upon Mr. Parry directs that he appear 
and show cause why the slot machines should not 
be destroyed. It is our contention, as hereinafter 
set out, that it was not necessary in order to lf1w-
fully take possession of these slot machines for the 
8heriff to make an affidavit or to ~et a writ of 
attachment, and it is there~ore immaterial whethPr 
such proceedings· he in personam or in rem, or at all. 
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4 
However, if the court should feel that such pro-
ceedings are necessary and that they should be 
in rem, then we submit that the proceedings 
adopted by the respondents were in rem. Surely, 
they were not in personam. The affidavit signed 
by the Sheriff simply s,tated that he had reason to 
believe and did believe that four slot machines were 
being operated at the Lodge contrary to law. No-
body was accused of any criminal act. The writ did 
not demand the arrest of anybody, but ordered that 
the machines be taken. rrhe nature of pleadings is 
determined largely by the relief sought, and in 
construing a pleading as to whether or not it is in 
rem or in personam, the court should be guided by 
the purpose sought to be accomplished, which in the 
instant case was to take possession of the machines 
and to destroy them. It will be seen, therefore, 
that the said proceedings were in effect an action 
to seize and destroy gambling devices. 
We call the Court's attention to 
Section 1 03-25-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, 
which among other things relates to slot machines, 
and insofar as material here, provides that: 
". . . It shall be the duty of all sheriffs~ 
constables, police and other peace officers 
whenever it shall come to the knowledge of 
such officer that any person has in his pos-
session any cards, tables, checks, balls, 
wheels, slot machines. or gambling devices 
of any nature or kind whatsoever- used or 
kept for the purpose of playing for money, 
or for tokens redeemable in money, at any 
of the games mentioned in this chapter. or 
that any cards, tables, checks, balls, wheels, 
slot machines or gambling devices used or 
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5 
kept for the purposes aforesaid may be 
found in any place, to seize and take such 
cards, tables, checks, balls, wheels, slot 
machines or other g-an1bling device~, and 
convey the same before a magistrate of the 
county in which such devices shall be 
found; and it shall be the duty of such 
mag·istrate to inquire of such "·itncsses 
as he shall summon or as may appear be-
for~ him in that behalf touching the nature 
of such gambling devices, and, if such 
magistrate shall determine that the same 
are used or kept for the purpose of being 
used at any game or games of chance de-
scribed in this chapter, it shall be his duty 
to destroy the same.'' 
Section 103-25-6 of the same Chapter pro-
vides that: 
"Every prosecuting attorney, sheriff~ con-
stable and police officer must inform 
against and diligently• prosecute persons 
whom they have reasonable cause to be-
lieve to be offenders against the provisions 
of this chapter, and every such officer re-
fusing or neg-lecting so to do is guilty of 
a misdemeanor.'' 
Section 103-25-7 of the same Chapter pro-
vides that: 
''Every person who keeps. or operates, 
either as owner~ agent or employee, or 
allows to be kept, used, operated or con-
ducted, in his place of business or else-
where the device or instrument commonly 
known as a 'slot machine,' or any other 
Rimilar device or instrument for gambling-
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6 
or exhibiting bawdy pictures is guilty of 
a misdemeanor.'' 
It will be seen that Section 103-25-1 above 
quoted prescribes the procedure relating to the 
seizure and destruction of slot machines. It will 
also be noted that no court proceedings are neces-
sary before a Sheriff is authorized to seize a slot 
machine, if it comes to his knowledge that any per-
son has in his possession a slot machine used or 
kept for the purpose of playing for money or tokens 
redeemable in money. It is the duty of such offi-
cer to seize the same, and take it before the Justice 
of the Peace. It is the duty, then, of the Justice 
of the Peace as outlined in the statute above quoted 
to make inquiry of such witnesses as he may sum-
mon, or as may appear before him, and if he finds 
that the slot machine is used or kept for the pur-
pose of being used at any game of chance as de-
~cribed in this Chapter, it then becomes his duty 
to destroy the same. 
In the instant case,. the appellant claims to be 
the owner of the slot machines in question and was 
given notice, to appear at a time and place and show 
cause why the machines should not be destroyed. 
In view of the statute above quoted, it will be seen 
that it was not necessary for the Sheriff to go be-
fore a Justice of the Peace and make an affidavit 
and procure a writ of attachment before seizing 
these gambling devices. It was necessary, how-
ever, that the Justice o£ the Peace before destroy-
ing the machines have a hearing to determine 
whether they were used for gambling purposes, or 
kept for such use. If the procedure outlined in 
Section 103-25-1, supra, is constitutional, then, 
there is nothing, as we view it, to appellant's con-
tention that the machines were taken without due 
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7 
procP88, because the record clearly shows that these 
public officials co1nplied with said section. 
In reading the cases hereinafter cited and re-
ferred to, the Court will see that statutes of this 
nature, relating to slot machines, have been held 
constitutional insofar as the due process is con-
cerned, even when they afford no opportunity whaL 
soever for a hearing as to their lawful or unlawful 
use. On the other hand, our books abound with de-
cisions upholding the right to destroy gambling de-
vices under statutes like or similar to our Utah law. 
A discussion of the question under considr:ration is 
found in 
Volume 24, American Jurisprudence, under 
the title of ''Summary Destruction,'' 
at Page 436. 
N"umerous cases in the footnotes are cited uphold-
ing the text. ' 
We also call the Court's attention to the re-
cent case of 
State of South Carolina, ex rel. John M. 
Daniel, v. A. R. Kizer, et al, 81 
A.L.R., Page 722. 
This is one of the latest cases on the subject and 
together with the annotation at Page 730 of the 
Volume, seems to cover fully the question under 
consideration. 
\V e also refer the Court to 
24 American Jurisprudence at Page 438, 
where under the heading of ''Injunctions,'' the 
author says: 
"Equity will not int~rfere with the police 
in the enforcement of criminal statutes or 
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8 
extend its help for the purpose of aiding 
one to commit a crime, and equity will re-
fuse an injunction when the evident pur-
pd1se '.·i,thereo.fi iS' to ;prevent·. police inter-
ference in the conduct of an unlawful busi-
ness. Accordingly, owners of a gambling 
device have no standing in equity to ask 
for an injunction against the enforcement 
of a statute providing for the seizure and 
destruction of such a device. The owners 
of slot machines have an adequate remedy 
at law by action of claim and delivery which 
will preclude injunctive relief against the 
enforcement of a statute providing for the 
seizure and destruction of such machines if 
used as gambling devices.'' 
Numerous cases, are referred to in support of 
the !text. 
In his brief, counsel for appell~nt lays great 
stress on a recent decision of this Court. In re 
Utah Liquor Control Commission v. ·Wooras, 97 
Utah P. 351; 93 P. (2d) 455. In this case the Com-
mission sought to have destroyed certain property, 
presumably furniture and fixtures, in a place of 
.business upon the theory that the owner or pro-
prietor had permitted liquor to be sold in violation 
of our laws. The Court held that the Commission 
had failed to follow the procedure as outlined by 
our statute with reference to the destruction of such 
property in connection with the violation of our 
liquor laws, and in view of such failure held that 
the property may not he destroyed. Undoubtedly, 
the right to destroy such property is purely stat-
utory and the statutory procedure must Ee sub-
stantjally c0mplied with. 
In the case a.t bar, however, the respondent~ 
not only followed thP procerlure strictly as outlined 
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for the destruction of gambling devices, but took 
extra precautionary mea:sures by signin~ an affi-
davit before the Justice of the Peace and procuring 
a writ from him, and in addition thereto fixed a 
time whereby appellant could appear before the 
court and show cause why the property -in question 
should not be destroyed. 
Furthermore, there is a vast difference be-
tween statutes relating to the destruction of prop-
erty under our liquor laws and those relating to 
the destruction of slot machines, and there is also 
a vast difference between a gambling device such 
as a slot machine and the furniture, fixtures, etc. 
of a business enterprize. 
The remarks of Justice Pratt in his concurring 
opinion in the Wooras case seem pertinent to the 
questions under consideration in this case. He 
said: 
"If the property seized has but one use 
and that an illegal one: no one may claim 
it, as no one has the property right in an 
illegal thing . . . under such circumstances 
the invalidity of the seizure is immaterial. 
If any of the property seized in this case 
is of that class, then 'it should not be re-
turned." (P. 366, Utah Report). 
In the instant case, we have a Lodge with a 
tap-room in connection therewith. Thes.e four slot 
machines were in the tap-room. It was stipulated 
that a public official, if present, would testify that 
a day or two pri·or to the seizure of these machines, 
he saw them beiltg played in the regular way at the 
place of busineBs of appellant. It is alleged in 
the complaint that these machines were owned by 
the appellant and his brother, a co-partnership, and 
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10 
that at the time of seizure they had in them a sum 
in excess 1of $600. 
Under such circumstances, it would seem that 
something smaller than a hair must be split. to con-
vince anyone that these machines were not used ,or 
kept for the purpose of gambling. If the mach1nes 
had been owned by some person not connected with 
the business of the Lodge, a plausible excuse ,might 
be given that the large sum of money had been 
accumulating for some time until the owner of the 
machines could remove it, but where the operators 
of the Lodge were the owners, it is inconceivable 
that they would leave such a large sum of money 
in the machines if they were kept there for any 
other purpose than that of gambling. The evidence 
shows that a motion picture concern from Cali-
fornia was occupying all of the rooms at the Lodge 
at the time, and it is quite evident that the machines 
were installed for their special benefit, thus we 
can account for the large sums of money. Appel-
lant contends that inasmuch as the Lodge was being 
used entirely by these California people, it was 1n 
the nature of a private home, and hence, our law 
relating to the destruction of gambling devices is 
not applicable. We feel, however, that the Stars of 
Hollywood, when they come here, are amenable to 
our laws, and also that they are entitled to the 
.equal protection thereof. Furthermore. we know 
of no law that exempts gambling, even in a private 
home. 
If for no other reason, the petition for a re-
straining order was rightfully denied on the 
grounds that the appellant had a plain, speedy aT~d 
adequate 'remedy at law. He could have raised the 
is.sues before the Justice Court, and if not satisfied 
with the decision, could have appealed to the DiR-
trirt Court and thence, to this Court, or he could 
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11 
ha,~e brought an action in claim and delivery as 
suggested in some of the cases cited above. 
In conclusion, it is our contention that: 
I. 
The respondents in their attempt to destroy 
these slot machines complied strictly with our law 
relating thereto, and that such laws are not in con-
flict with the constitutional provisions relating to 
due process. 
II. 
The evidence and the natural inferences to he 
drawn therefrom appear conclusive that the four 
mechanical devices mentioned in appellant's com-
plaint are four old time slot machines, sometimes 
referred to as "one-arm bandits,'' and that they 
were used and kept for the purpose of gambling. 
m. 
The injunctive relief sought should he denied 
because the appellant has a plain, speedy and ade-
quate remedy at law. 
Most respectfully, 
JOSEPH CHEZ, Attorney General, 
DAVID L. PUGH, 
County Attorney, Kane County, 
S.D. HUFFAKER, 
Assh;tant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
